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Abstract
The paper describes the Generic Resolution Advisor and Conflict Evaluator (GRACE), a novel
alerting and guidance algorithm that combines flexibility, robustness, and computational efficiency.
GRACE is “generic” since it was designed without any assumptions regarding temporal or spatial
scales, aircraft performance, or its sensor and communication systems. Therefore, GRACE was
adopted as a core component of the Java Architecture for Detect-And-Avoid (DAA) Extensibility
and Modeling, developed by NASA as a research and modeling tool for Unmanned Aerial Systems
Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS). GRACE has been used in a number of real-time
and fast-time experiments supporting evolving requirements of DAA research, including parametric
studies, NAS-wide simulations, human-in-the-loop experiments, and live flight tests.
Glossary
ACAS Airborne Collision Avoidance System
ATC Air-Traffic Control
BADA Base of Aircraft Data
CPA Closest Point to Approach
DAA Detect-and-Avoid
DAIDALUS Detect and Avoid Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems
DGM Dynamic Grid Map
DWC DAA Well Clear
FMS Flight Management System
GCE Generic Conflict Evaluator
GCS Ground Control Station
GRA Generic Resolution Advisor
GRACE Generic Resolution Advisor and Conflict Evaluator
HITL Human-in-the-Loop
HMD Horizontal Miss Distance
JADEM Java Architecture for DAA Extensibility and Modeling
LoWC Loss of Well Clear
MATG Multimodal Adaptable Trajectory Generator
MOPS Minimum Operational Performance Standards
NAS National Airspace
NMAC Near Mid-Air Collisions
SC-228 RTCA Special Committee 228 working to develop UAS MOPS
TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
TCAS RA TCAS Resolution Advisories
TCP Trajectory Change Point
TSAFE Tactical Separation Assured Flight Environment
UA Unmanned Aircraft
UAS Unmanned Aerial Systems
VFR Visual Flight Rules
WCR Well Clear Recovery
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1 Introduction
Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) capability is a key enabler for safe integration of Unmanned Aerial Sys-
tems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS). One of the core challenges of such capability
is to meet FAA requirements to “see and avoid” and when passing other aircraft to remain “well
clear” as mandated for manned aircraft in 14 CFR §91.113 [1], “Rules of the Road”. As specified by
the FAA both “see and avoid” and “well clear” implicitly rely on pilot judgement and visual acuity,
hence they are inherently subjective. DAA systems are intended to enable UAS to remain “well
clear” and avoid collisions with other airborne traffic [2–4] and to do so they require an objective
definition of “well clear” (henceforth referred to as DAA Well Clear or DWC). DAA is required
to provide detection and guidance to maintain DWC and, where DWC is lost, to provide recovery
guidance to regain it. Note that DWC does not replace controller required separation but rather
supplements it.
To support DAA capability, the DAA system should provide the following functions [2, 5]:
1. Detect: Use one or more onboard sensors to detect traffic in the vicinity of the unmanned
aircraft.
2. Track: Use (noisy) detection results to (optimally) estimate traffic positions and velocities.
3. Evaluate: Assess collision risk of tracked traffic.
4. Prioritize: Assess threat priorities (urgency levels).
5. Declare: Alert pilot to avoidance action required.
6. Determine: Decide what action to take.
7. Command: Communicate the action for execution.
8. Execute: Execute the commanded action.
Requirements for DAA systems are currently being developed by RTCA Special Committee 228
(SC-228) as a means for UAS to meet the aforementioned “see and avoid” rules. SC-228 has
approved the draft DAA minimum operational performance standards (MOPS) in December 2016.
At the time of this paper, the DAA MOPS is awaiting review and approval by the RTCA Program
Management Committee. In the development of the MOPS, DAA systems were envisioned as a
means to maintain a low level of risk of Near Mid-Air Collisions (NMAC), defined as a violation
of 500 ft horizontal and 100 ft vertical separation threshold [6]. To accomplish this goal, SC-
228 investigated a number of objective definitions of Well Clear [7]. It was therefore essential to
quantify the levels of risk achieved by proposed DAA concepts and definitions of DWC. To that
end, NASA developed a portable software system, Java Architecture for DAA Extensibility and
Modeling (JADEM) that supports various DAA algorithms and can interface with different fast-
time and real-time simulation tools and live systems. The target users of JADEM are researchers
who need to simulate the main features of proposed DAA systems before those systems are fully
developed by manufacturers.
Integration of diverse DAA algorithms poses a significant challenge in DAA architectures. Further-
more, the different separation standards used and the complexity of interactions between them can
introduce difficult and subtle interoperability issues and can make evaluation of a DAA architecture
more problematic.
For these reasons, NASA recognized the need for a flexible “generic” alerting and resolution algo-
2
rithm that could help reduce the complexity of DAA system modeling. The subject of this paper
is the Generic Resolution Advisor and Conflict Evaluator (GRACE), the algorithm that was de-
veloped to fill that need. In addition to its core alerting and resolution features, GRACE powers
the recently introduced “OmniBands” and “Well Clear Recovery” (WCR) guidance concepts as
implemented in JADEM (see Section 6, subsections 6.3 and 6.4).
GRACE was used in a number of NASA NAS-wide fast-time simulations, real-time Human-in-the-
loop (HITL) simulations with participation of experienced UAS pilots and air traffic controllers,
and flight tests with live aircraft [10–14]. The complex and rapidly evolving requirements of these
studies demanded and created ample opportunities for extensive evaluation of GRACE in a broad
range of operational scenarios and applications. These simulations confirmed the ability of GRACE
to support the alerting and guidance features proposed for future DAA systems. The goal of this
paper is to describe GRACE with sufficient algorithmic detail to be of interest to UAS researchers
and to developers of practical DAA systems for manufacture and deployment.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of previous work related to
development of DAA algorithms. Section 3 briefly describes JADEM and its use in NASA research.
GRACE features and algorithmic details are described in Sections 4, 4.1, and 4.2. Section 5
describes the cost functions used by GRACE. Section 6 highlights the use of GRACE in alerting and
guidance models supported by JADEM DAA. Section 7 provides sample results from an evaluation
of GRACE. Finally, concluding remarks are presented in Section 8.
2 Background
A number of algorithms that could in principle support conflict detection and avoidance capabilities
of DAA have been proposed (see Ref. 4, 15 and the references therein). Several algorithms were
inspired by the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) [16] that has been very suc-
cessful in preventing mid-air collisions for manned aircraft. These systems rely on the cooperative
behavior of aircraft, which actively communicate their state and intent data [17, 18], hence said
systems cannot be used with non-cooperative aircraft.
Some algorithms were specifically designed for certain types of onboard sensors, such as radars
[17] or optical sensors [19]. Other algorithms, such as Jointly Optimal Collision Avoidance, are
in principle sensor-agnostic [20], but tuned for specific Aircraft Response Model. Another next
generation algorithm, the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS), proposed to replace TCAS
[21], is more flexible and can be adapted to different aircraft, including UAS, by updating the
probabilistic lookup table driving the ACAS threat logic. However, these algorithms do not use
separation standards that would be needed to maintain Well Clear as defined by SC-228. Note that
DAA support is currently being added to ACAS-Xu (the version of ACAS supporting UAS).
Other algorithms, more suitable for Separation Assurance in Air-Traffic Control (ATC), include
the Profile Selector En Route (PFS-E) component of the Center / TRACON Automation Sys-
tem [22], and Autoresolver and TSAFE developed for NASA’s Automated Airspace Concept [23].
However for use in DAA, these algorithms would require non-trivial modifications to accommodate
smaller look-ahead-times and spatial separation standards, introduction of time separation, lack of
trajectory intent information, and more frequent update rates.
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More recent algorithms, “inspired by nature,” include “force field” methods [24–26], the closely
related “light propagation” model [27], and “navigation function-based” algorithms that model
aircraft as particles moving in a potential field formed by other aircraft with the same “charge”
and hence generating a “repulsive force” [28,29]. These algorithms demonstrated their effectiveness
in guaranteed collision avoidance, but they can lead to overcosts and large deviations from nominal
routes [31].
A number of algorithms are based on optimization methods, which provide a very general frame-
work for non-linear systems (see Ref. 4 and references therein). These methods typically use a
mathematically rigorous Hamilton-Jacobi approach or heuristic optimization algorithms, such as
simulated annealing [30] or genetic algorithms [31]. These methods are efficient enough for strategic
flight planning, but they are still not sufficiently fast for real-time applications with update rate on
the order of seconds. Another drawback of these methods is that they model smooth trajectories
suitable for future FMS abilities but not (currently) practical for use in UAS DAA systems.
The Generic Resolution Advisor and Conflict Evaluator (GRACE), the subject of this paper, was
inspired by the ideas of force field [24–26] and complexity theory [32] and leveraged computational
efficiency of grid-based methods [33, 34]. GRACE provided the benefits of flexibility, robustness,
and good computational performance, which made it more suitable for evolving requirements of
research and modeling of future DAA systems. It was therefore adopted in 2013 for providing
the core alerting and guidance functions of NASA’s Java Architecture for DAA Extensibility and
Modeling (JADEM). GRACE also provided fast conflict detection logic for Autoresolver Adapted
for DAA (Autoresolver-AD), which was integrated in JADEM a year later.
Note that concurrent to the development of JADEM, NASA was also developing the Detect and
Avoid Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems (DAIDALUS) [35]. DAIDALUS is the latest product of
years of research on formal Verification and Validation methods for the safe integration of advanced
air traffic concepts and algorithms in the National Airspace System. DAIDALUS was first released
as open source in 2015. In contrast to GRACE, which was designed as a general purpose conflict
detection and resolution algorithm, DAIDALUS was specifically tailored to DAA alerting and
guidance requirements as defined in the draft MOPS, and selected by RTCA SC-228 as the reference
implementation of aforementioned requirements. DAIDALUS is currently being integrated into
JADEM as an alternate alerting and guidance module.
It should be noted that JADEM was expressly designed to host different DAA algorithms. This
provides several important benefits:
• allows to choose an algorithm best suited to each experiment’s goals, requirements, and
constraints;
• simplifies comparison between algorithms, helping identify and address their weaknesses;
• provides an extra level of verification, increasing the overall confidence in JADEM’s simulation
results;
• helps clearly differentiate between common DAA performance characteristics and algorithm/implementation-
specific behaviors.
The next section briefly describes JADEM and its components.
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3 Java Architecture for DAA Extensibility and Modeling (JA-
DEM)
JADEM was developed to enable various research activities in support of DAA MOPS development,
verification, and validation; these activities include
1. NAS-wide closed-loop simulations;
2. parametric studies of DAA system performance;
3. HITL simulations;
4. live flight tests.
To that end JADEM was designed as a portable software system, composed of Detect-And-Avoid
(DAA) module and additional supporting software (such as test drivers, validation logic, pilot
models, tracking and sensor models, TCAS, and NAS-wide simulation capability). Figure 1 shows
how DAA can be used in a Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) architecture. DAA is discussed
in more detail in the remainder of this section.
Figure 1. DAA use in LVC Architecture
In Fig. 1, the aircraft publishes TCAS, navigation, and surveillance data from its onboard systems
and receives flight commands from the Ground Control Station (GCS). The GCS receives the data
from onboard systems as well as DAA alerting and guidance, which the pilot uses to command flight
maneuvers. The DAA Agent handles communication with the rest of the system and delegates DAA
processing to JADEM’s DAA module.
In addition to the models implemented in JADEM, the DAA module provides simplified perfect
and noisy sensor models, an extended Kalman Filter with source selection tracker, GRACE, bands
and WCR models, and supports integration of other resolution algorithms. The DAA module
also supports trajectory prediction generically and JADEM provides a fast and robust kinematic
implementation, the Multimodal Adaptable Trajectory Generator (MATG). MATG can handle
any constraints (position, heading, speed, altitude, vertical speed, and time) in any combination
for nominal and off-nominal conditions. It can be easily adapted for real aircraft behavior derived
from track data, for aircraft performance models from the Base of Aircraft Data (BADA) (see
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Ref. 36 and references therein), and for modeling unconventional aircraft not currently supported
by BADA.
4 Generic Resolution Advisor and Conflict Evaluator (GRACE)
As implemented in JADEM, GRACE is an aircraft-centric algorithm that works to predict and
prevent collision threats to a single unmanned aircraft (the “ownship”) from all other aircraft
(“intruders”).
Using the taxonomy defined in Ref. 15, GRACE can be characterized as:
Dimensions: Horizontal and Vertical planes
Detection: Explicit conflict detection threshold (but user-defined)
Resolution: Optimized
Maneuvers: Turns, Vertical maneuvers, and Speed changes
Multiple: Global
GRACE is a combination of two loosely coupled algorithms: Generic Conflict Evaluator (GCE) and
Generic Resolution Advisor (GRA). GCE provides a customizable implementation of the evaluate
function of DAA. GRA is a fast general purpose conflict resolver that recommends a resolution for
use in the determine function of DAA.
GRACE does not make any assumptions regarding temporal or spatial scales, performance capa-
bilities of aircraft, or its sensor and communication systems. This flexibility is achieved by using
customizable separation standards in GCE and cost function in GRA, and by reliance on an ex-
ternal trajectory predictor for modeling aircraft flight mechanics thus allowing users to select the
fidelity level suitable for experimental needs. In particular, GRACE can be used for rotorcraft or
other unconventional UAS.
A cost function used by GRA can be easily extended to include additional terms accounting for
weather conditions, fuel consumption, or any other factors affecting the quality of resolutions.
4.1 Generic Conflict Evaluator (GCE)
GCE is an efficient deterministic algorithm for assessing intruder threats based on user-defined
separation standards (described in the next section). It is a core module used in DAA evaluation
and guidance functions as implemented in JADEM.
4.1.1 Separation Standards
The following logical condition is typically used to indicate a threat for DAA systems
(HMD ≤ HMD∗) ∧ (0 ≤ τmod ≤ Tmod ) ∧ (|∆z| ≤ ZTHR) = true (1)
Here HMD is the Horizontal Miss Distance defined as the minimum horizontal distance between the
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ownship and intruder positions estimated by extrapolating along their respective headings. τmod is
“modified tau” defined by Eq. (3). |∆z| is the vertical separation between ownship and intruder
states. HMD∗, Tmod , and ZTHR are specified threshold values.
For a given set of thresholds, the left hand side of Eq. (1) defines what will henceforth be referred
to as the separation standard; it is also used to define DWC. In this paper, the term “violation” (of
separation) will be used, in a broad sense, to indicate that Eq. (1) holds for any given separation
standard, and the more specific term “Loss of Well Clear” (LoWC) will be used to indicate a
violation of the DWC.
Separation standards supported by GCE can include almost any combination of the following (along
with corresponding thresholds and filtering conditions):
• horizontal separation;
• vertical separation;
• tau-separation;
• Horizontal Miss Distance (HMD);
• time to Closest Point of Approach (CPA);
• time to first loss (violation) of separation.
Tau-separation can be defined as “simple tau”
τ = −r
r˙
(2)
or “modified tau”
τmod =

−(r2xy −DMOD2)/(rxy · r˙xy) if r˙xy < 0 and rxy > DMOD
0 if rxy ≤ DMOD
∞ if r˙xy ≥ 0 and rxy > DMOD
(3)
Here r is the distance between the ownship and intruder positions known also as “slant range”, r˙ is
the rate of change of r, rxy is the horizontal distance between the ownship and intruder positions,
r˙xy is the rate of change of rxy, DMOD is the distance modification. DMOD values and τ thresholds
can be constant or altitude-dependent as defined, for example, by TCAS sensitivity levels [37]. Note
that the last case in Eq. 3 corresponds to diverging encounter geometries and, per Eq. (1), does
not indicate a violation.
In addition, a “vertical tau”, known also as “time to co-altitude”, can be defined:
τz = −zI − zO
z˙I − z˙O (4)
where zO, zI , z˙I , and z˙O are ownship and intruder altitudes and altitude change rates respectively.
GCE also supports the Air Force “acorn” Well Clear definition and several simplified Well Clear
definitions based only on initial states of ownship and intruder or on extrapolated (dead-reckoned)
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ownship trajectories as opposed to trajectories adhering to flight constraints [7]. These definitions
can be useful for researching interoperability with different evaluation logics, such as the one used
by TCAS [38].
GCE can support several different “levels” of threat detection, each level being defined by its own
user-specified separation standard. For instance, a separation standard for the highest severity
threat can be set to NMAC as defined in TCAS (500× 100 ft).
4.1.2 Dynamic Grid Mapping and Threat Detection
GCE can be used in two different roles:
1. in the evaluate function to identify the threats that may trigger the determine function; in
this role it is called once for each call to the DAA system;
2. in the determine function to assess whether candidate maneuvers will result in a conflict-free
trajectory; in this role GCE can be called many times (once per candidate maneuver); for
this reason, its computational performance is critical.
GCE computation time is essentially linear with the number of intruders. Therefore a key perfor-
mance challenge is to efficiently identify aircraft that can potentially create threats prior to making
any geometrical computations, which while straightforward, can be time-consuming. This needs
to be done for arbitrary aircraft positions, which can deviate from the nominal route (based on
intent) or proposed resolutions.
GCE uses a fast algorithm that avoids distance calculations. The algorithm is based on an airspace
model consisting of identical discrete elements, or cells (the model is referred to as the “Dynamic
Grid Map” or DGM). DGM provides a quick way to find intruders close to any arbitrary ownship
state by “mapping” all intruder trajectories predicted within a specified “look-ahead time”. This
can be seen as a deterministic variant of the method proposed in Ref. 33. Figure 2 illustrates the
main idea of this method.
The GCE algorithm involves three main operations:
1. Predicting intruder trajectories at discrete time steps up to a specified look-ahead time.
2. Mapping intruders by locating them in DGM cells (Fig. 2) using simple comparisons between
the intruder coordinates and cell boundaries. Note that DGM is stored efficiently as a time
sequence of hash maps, which are only populated with “occupied” cells.
3. Detecting threats from mapped intruders. This uses simple comparisons between cell bound-
aries and a bounding box with a side 2δ around the ownship’s position to identify potential
intruders, where δ is a horizontal distance deduced from the separation standards (Fig. 3).
Intruders found within this bounding box are passed to the state-based threat detection
logic, which uses specified separation standards to evaluate threats. A threat is considered
“detected” if it is found to violate separation standards at least at one timestep.
If more than one threat is “detected”, GCE performs the prioritize function by returning the first
threat with the earliest conflict start time, which is defined as the time of the first state that
violated the separation standard.
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Figure 2. Dynamic grid mapping the intruder trajectories
Note that the first operation, which is expensive, is only done once, the resulting DGM subsequently
being used in the determine function. This dramatically reduces DAA computation time.
Figure 3. Grid-based threat detection
4.2 Generic Resolution Advisor
The Generic Resolution Advisor (GRA) is the conflict resolution component of GRACE. It relies on
the output from GCE (including the highest priority declared threat) and DGM. The main output
of GRA is a resolution that includes a recommended avoidance maneuver and a corresponding
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ownship predicted trajectory.
GRA uses fast analytical transformations of linearized ownship trajectories before calling GCE for
rigorous re-evaluation of candidate resolutions. It relies on user-defined cost functions for selecting
the best maneuver. This promotes high computational efficiency without sacrificing flexibility or
quality of proposed resolutions.
4.2.1 GRA Algorithm at a Glance
GRA obtains a resolution by trying to find a simple Standard Maneuver that would result in a
conflict-free solution.
The following six Standard Maneuvers (in the remainder of the paper we refer to them simply as
“maneuvers”) can be used (see Fig. 4):
1. Turn Right;
2. Turn Left;
3. Vertical Up: increased vertical speed / flight path angle (faster climb or slower descent);
4. Vertical Down: reduced vertical speed / flight path angle (slower climb or faster descent);
5. Speed Down (decelerate);
6. Speed Up (accelerate).
Figure 4. Standard Maneuvers in Generic Resolution Advisor
Finding the best maneuver starts from a local transformation of the CPA, for the highest priority
threat, into a Trajectory Change Point (TCP) such that it satisfies the following conditions:
1. it should not violate any separation criteria;
2. it should constitute a CPA for the transformed trajectory.
The first condition is self-explanatory. The second condition is needed to ensure that after passing
the TCP an aircraft could return to its initial route without the risk of encountering the same threat.
This is important to improve the stability of proposed resolutions and to help pilots determine when
they can safely execute a “recapture” maneuver returning to mission flight plan. Effectively, the
TCP defines the end of maneuver in GRA.
10
GRA starts by finding a linear trajectory calculated by extrapolating the state at CPA backwards
to the desired start time (see section 4.2.2 for details). Each of maneuvers listed above is applied
in user-defined increments (steps), such as 5 degrees for heading change and 1 degree for change in
flight path angle. At every step:
1. a new TCP is obtained by perturbing the linearized trajectory in the direction dictated by
the applied maneuver and analytically estimating the CPA along the new trajectory;
2. the candidate TCP is evaluated to determine whether it is “locally conflict-free” (i.e. does
not violate separation criteria);
3. if the answer is “yes”, a candidate solution is re-evaluated by calling GCE, which checks for
conflicts with all intruders in DGM to verify that the solution is “globally conflict-free” within
the specified lookahead time; this involves generating a new ownship trajectory with the TCP
added as a new constraint;
4. if re-evaluation did not confirm that the solution is “globally conflict-free”, these operations
are repeated, in the next step, for the same maneuver until the predefined limit in change of
control variable (heading, flight path angle, or speed) is reached.
If the new solution is “better” than the previous “best” candidate, it replaces it as the new “best”.
Note that first two operations use fast analytic calculations. The third operation takes advantage of
GCE optimization provided by DGM, but still requires computationally intensive calls to Trajectory
Predictor for generating a new ownship trajectory. However these calls are made typically only
once for each maneuver rather than at every step, because in most cases reevaluation confirms
that solution is conflict-free and immediately terminates iterations. This helps greatly reduce
computation time.
This sequence of operations is shown in Fig. 5, which is further clarified in the remainder of this
section.
4.2.2 Fast Linearized Analytic Solution for Finding TCP
If a CPA for the original ownship trajectory (black solid curve in Fig. 6) and a predicted intruder
trajectory (red curve) is known from the output of GCE, then the CPA for any perturbed ownship
trajectory (blue curve) can be quickly estimated from an analytical solution based on linearization
of predicted ownship and intruder trajectories near the CPA as illustrated in Fig. 6.
As a first step, the states of ownship and intruder at CPA (shown as arrows) are extrapolated
backward to a maneuver start time that may include an anticipated delay in maneuver execution
(referred to herein as “algorithm delay”), as shown by dashed black and red lines, respectively.
This approximation is justified because the accurate representation of trajectory around a CPA is
most important for evaluation of candidate resolutions. It also simplifies modeling of manuevers by
applying them to the extrapolated ownship state rather than to its actual initial state. Therefore,
the perturbed ownship trajectory is approximated by a straight line, shown as a dashed blue line
in Fig. 6. Then, a candidate TCP can be defined as the CPA for the perturbed trajectory, shown
as an arrow on the blue line. Note that this approach is based on the predicted trajectories from
GCE, therefore it does not require any assumptions regarding the availability of intent data for
ownship and intruders.
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Figure 5. Generic Resolution Advisor algorithm
The CPA is found from the time to minimal distance between ownship and intruder positions on
their linearized trajectories, assuming that they are moving with constant speeds (see Ref. 38). The
distance between the ownship (O) and the intruder (I) at time t for linearized trajectories is given
by
r(t) =
√∑
k
(∆xk + ∆vkt)2 (5)
where k represents a cartesian component and the summation occurs over all three components,
with
∆xk = (xI − xO)k, ∆vk = (vI − vO)k are intruder’s coordinates and velocities relative to ownship,
(xO)k - initial ownship’s position,
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Figure 6. Linearization of the ownship and intruder trajectories near TCP
(xI)k - initial intruder’s position,
(vO)k - ownship’s velocity,
(vI)k - intruder’s velocity.
The distance between ownship and intruder positions at CPA is
r(tCPA) = rCPA = min{r(t)} <=> dr(tCPA)/dt = 0 (6)
and can be obtained from
r˙ ≡ dr/dt =
∑
k ∆xk∆vk +
∑
k (∆vk)
2t
r
= 0 (7)
Hence, the time to CPA
tCPA = max
{
0,−
∑
k ∆xk∆vk∑
k (∆vk)2)
}
(8)
Although this procedure gives the same equation for time to CPA as Ref. 38, it uses positions
and velocities from the states extrapolated backward from CPA for original trajectories predicted
by GCE and not from the observed initial states. This ensures more accurate TCP if a CPA for
perturbed trajectory does not deviate too much from the original CPA.
4.2.3 Fast CPA Evaluation Using State-based Threat Detector
The ownship and intruder positions at CPA are simply:
(xO)i + (vO)i · tCPA (9)
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(xI)i + (vI)i · tCPA (10)
Only the horizontal and vertical separation need to be checked to determine whether a correspond-
ing candidate solution will be “locally conflict-free” since dr/dt used in equations (2) and (3) is
equal to zero at CPA according to (6).
4.2.4 Re-evaluation of Solutions
Once a fast check has determined that a solution is “locally conflict-free”, quick evaluation is
repeated at the next step to account for possible uncertainty. If the solution is still conflict-free
or a limit of control variable (e.g. heading or flight path angle) is reached, the solution is re-
evaluated using a Trajectory Predictor of sufficient fidelity, such as MATG, to account for aircraft
performance and to check for conflicts with other intruders. This step involves recalculation of
the ownship predicted trajectory starting with actual rather than extrapolated initial state and
using constraints modified by adding the new TCP. This trajectory then is rigorously evaluated for
conflicts with all intruders’ trajectories within a specified look-ahead time as described in a section
4.1. Note that intruder trajectories do not need to be re-calculated since they are not perturbed.
4.2.5 Limits of Control Variables
GRA provides configurable “operational limits” of control variables for maneuvers. For instance,
users can limit the maximum heading change for turns by 90 degrees, and the maximum change in
flight path angle for vertical maneuvers by 5 degrees.
In addition to operational limits, GRA estimates “dynamic limits” of control variables, based on
aircraft performance.
GRA stops incrementing the control variable for each maneuver if it reaches either its dynamic or
operational limit.
4.2.6 Selection of Candidate Resolutions
GRA can run in two user configurable “control modes”. In the so called “UseFirst” control mode,
GRA returns the first conflict-free solution it finds. In this case GRA works faster, guarantees that
it will find a conflict-free solutions if it exists, and provides solutions that are almost always stable
but not necessarily optimal.
On the other hand, if a conflict-free resolution does not exist, or if GRA is configured for the so
called “UseBest” control mode, GRA will find the best resolution using the following rules:
1. if the best solution was not defined yet, the first candidate solution becomes the best solution;
2. if a candidate solution is conflict-free and the old best solution is not conflict-free, the candi-
date solution becomes the new best solution;
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3. if a candidate solution and the old best solution are both conflict-free or both not conflict-
free, and the cost of candidate solution is lower than the cost of the old best solution, the
candidate solution becomes the new best solution;
4. in all other cases the best solution does not change.
Note that, even though a TCP estimated from linearized trajectories is approximate, a candidate
resolution is always based on the predicted ownship trajectory, generated using all known informa-
tion about the ownship flight constraints (including the TCP) and aircraft performance.
5 Cost Factors
GRA can use any externally defined cost function to select the best resolution maneuver. However,
the choice of cost function may have a significant impact on the performance of GRACE.
In JADEM’s cost model the total cost of any maneuver is represented as a weighted sum of indi-
vidual costs
C =
∑
i
WiFi (11)
where Wi are the “weights” of different “cost factors” Fi.
The JADEM cost model includes the following terms:
• maneuver rank cost, which ranks maneuver types by an order of preference (e.g. to support
right of way rules);
• maneuver type cost, which is used to penalize or suppress specific maneuver types;
• maneuver strength cost, which penalizes maneuvers that are too aggressive, such as sharp
turns or steep climbs and descents;
• maneuver change cost, which penalizes maneuver type changes within an encounter;
• holding cost, which favors shorter maneuvers to reduce the deviations from original flight plan
and the impact of uncertainties;
• collision threat cost, which increases rapidly, dominating all other costs, as the separation at
predicted CPA (for all intruders and within the look-ahead time) decreases.
Other costs (fuel-saving, time-saving, etc.) can be easily added if needed.
The “weights” of all cost factors, except the collision threat cost, are customizable and can be
used to fine-tune the behavior of DAA algorithms. Usually the default cost factors work well for
GRACE, whether it is used for directive guidance or for OmniBands and WCR.
5.1 Maneuver Rank Cost
Each maneuver type is assigned a rank cost to achieve a preferred order:
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rank (k) SM
0 Right Turn
1 Left Turn
2 Increased vertical speed
3 Reduced vertical speed
4 Slow down
5 Speed up
The rank cost factor is defined as:
Frank = k (12)
A maneuver with lower rank has lower cost and is therefore preferred over a maneuver with higher
rank. For instance, all other things being equal, right turns are preferred over left turns, which
in turn are preferred over all other maneuvers. By adjusting Wrank the users can control the
significance of this ranking or disable it entirely.
5.2 Maneuver Type Cost
Operational considerations might necessitate penalizing or suppressing individual maneuver types
on an encounter by encounter basis. For instance, “Vertical Up” maneuvers should be suppressed if
the UAS receives a TCAS Resolution Advisory to descend. Another example would be penalizing
“Vertical Down” maneuvers for low flying aircraft.
The simplest way to accommodate such requirements is to assign each maneuver type its own cost,
which in JADEM is given by
FM = 1 (13)
The weights WM can be adjusted dynamically (to large values) to penalize or suppress maneuvers
as needed.
5.3 Maneuver Strength Cost
It is usually undesirable to use extreme maneuvers (very sharp turns, steep climbs, etc.) if it is
possible to avoid conflicts without them. For example, if a threat can be avoided using a 10 degree
left turn or using a 50 degree right turn, then the left turn should be chosen. This is accounted for
by the Maneuver Strength (MS) cost
FMS =
p
plim
(14)
where p is a maneuver-specific control parameter, and plim is its limiting value. For heading
maneuvers the control parameter is the difference between the target and the initial headings; for
vertical maneuvers this can be a change in flight path angle or vertical speed (load factor). The
values of plim are based on user-defined operational limits for the corresponding control variables.
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5.4 Maneuver Change Cost
The Maneuver Change (MC) cost penalizes frequent changes of maneuver types. This is needed
to ensure stability of resolution advisories issued by GRACE, which is essential to avoid confusing
pilots with unreasonably frequent changes of proposed resolutions.
The following Maneuver Change (MC) cost factor can help alleviate this problem:
FMC = 1− δk,k′ (15)
Here k, k′ are the ranks of last and previous maneuvers recommended by GRA, and δk,k′ is the
Kronecker delta, which is defined as 1 for k = k′ (the same maneuver), and 0 otherwise (changed
maneuver).
5.5 Holding Cost
The maneuver Holding (H) cost can be used to minimize the deviations from original flight plan if
desired. This can be done by defining the following cost factor:
FH = TH/Tlim (16)
Here TH = tE − tS is the maneuver holding time (duration), defined as the difference between
maneuver start time tS and maneuver end time tE , and Tlim is the look-ahead time.
While Holding and Maneuver costs appear similar (compare Eqs. (16) and (14)), they serve different
roles. Figure 7 illustrates that the Maneuver Strength and Holding costs do not always act in
the same direction. The dashed line in this figure shows the original ownship route after the
arrow indicating a predicted CPA. The end points (TCP) for right and left turns are indicated by
TCPRIGHT and TCPLEFT . The right turn in this case would have a lower Rank cost and Maneuver
Strength cost, but its duration, and hence its Holding cost, would be higher. In this case, GRACE
would likely recommend the left turn. This would be consistent with pilot intuition to reduce the
deviation from original route and to avoid crossing ahead of the intruder.
5.6 Collision Threat Cost
The most safety-critical cost is the cost of approaching the NMAC threshold. This cost should
become very high once the separation at CPA becomes lower than the NMAC limit, and it should
rapidly decrease as a function of the distance relative to this limit. A suitable simple function to
express this dependency, the curl of Agnesi, is used in NMAC (Collision) threat cost factor in the
following way
FNMAC =
∑
i
1
1 + (max{rh,i/δh, rv,i/δv})2 (17)
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TCPLEFT
TCPRIGHT
CPA
Figure 7. Right and left turns with competing costs
Here rh,i and rv,i are the predicted horizontal and vertical separations between the ownship and
i-th intruder at CPA, δh and δv are the minimal horizontal and vertical separations, and summation
is taken over all intruders with predicted CPA within a specified lookahead time. The values of δh
and δv are defined as 500 ft and 100 ft respectively, which corresponds to NMAC thresholds, but in
general they can be considered as horizontal and vertical uncertainty parameters that can increase
with trajectory prediction errors.
WNMAC in the JADEM cost model is not user-defined. It is hard-coded to a large value to ensure
that a collision threat cost always dominates over all other costs when CPA distance between the
ownship and intruders becomes comparable with NMAC threshold δh × δv.
6 GRACE Applications
GRACE provides a unique combination of computational performance and flexibility that makes
it suitable for use in diverse applications. The most obvious potential uses are as a fast conflict
detection algorithm (GCE), as an automatic guidance algorithm for UAS (GRA), or as a model
of such guidance in simulations of UAS. GRACE has been used for modeling UAS DAA systems
in a number of parametric/factorial studies [39, 40] and NAS-wide simulations [10, 41, 42]. The
methodology of such studies is described in section 7.
The focus of this section is on applications of GRACE for alerting and guidance tools supported
by JADEM. These tools have been evaluated and refined in the following HITL studies and flight
tests:
• Full Mission HITL simulation (2013), which examined the effect of different command and
control interfaces on UAS pilots’ ability to get in-the-loop to respond to ATC clearances [43].
• Part Task 4 study (PT4, 2014), which examined UAS pilots’ subjective assessments of four
DAA display configurations with either basic or advanced levels of information [44].
• Interactive HITL simulation (IHITL, 2014), which was conducted to investigate appropriate
procedures for UAS DAA systems and optimal timing for pilots requesting or executing
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separation maneuvers [13].
• Part Task 5 study (PT5, 2015), which examined UAS pilots’ subjective assessments of four
DAA display configurations with varying forms of maneuver guidance [14,45].
• Flight Test 3 (FT3, 2015), which validated CPA prediction accuracy and DAA alerting logic
and trajectory model (including maneuvers) in realistic flight conditions, and evaluated TCAS
interoperability with a DAA system to inform the final SC-228 DAA MOPS [46].
• Flight Test 4 (FT4, 2016), which extended FT3 for multi-intruder encounters, improved
guidance stability for noisy surveillance, and added WCR guidance for Regain Well Clear
and support for TCAS 71 messages.
• Mini HITL study (2016) that examined maneuver guidance designs for pilots performing
Maintain and Regain Well Clear tasks [47].
• Part Task 6 study (PT6, 2016), which investigated TCAS/DAA interoperability to support
the final MOPS for displays, alerting, and guidance [48].
In all these studies, GRACE was used to provide alerting for UAS pilots. In Full Mission HITL,
PT4, and IHITL studies, GRACE was also used to give directive guidance to pilots. In later HITL
studies and flight tests, GRACE was used to compute OmniBands and WCR.
The following sub-sections describe these applications in more detail.
6.1 Alerting System for UAS Pilots
GRACE was extensively used in several HITL studies to evaluate different proposals on alerting
systems for ground pilots. Figure 8 shows one of the alerting structures that have been evaluated.
In this table, DMOD , HMD∗, Tmod , and ZTHR were defined in Eqs. (1) and (3) and tCPA is the
estimated time to CPA, defined in Eq. (8).
Figure 8. An example of alerting structure
In all these studies GCE was used to generate all alert levels. The visual symbols in Fig. 8 were
used in the pilot display. In some studies GRA was also used in conjunction with GCE to evaluate
different guidance tools and to study TCAS RA interoperability requirements as described in the
following sub-sections.
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6.2 Directive Guidance
The simplest use for GRA is to provide directive guidance to ground pilots. In this case, maneuvers
proposed by the algorithm are presented to the pilot at the GCS display. The pilot can accept the
proposed maneuvers or choose different ones.
According to post-trial questionnaires in PT4 study, all pilots accepted between 75% and 100% of
collision avoidance maneuvers recommended by GRACE.
6.3 OmniBands
As an alternative to traditional directive guidance, a new “OmniBands” tool had been recently
proposed for evaluation in the HITL study. The OmniBands can be seen as an “omni-directional
determine function” that defines alerted and conflict-free headings and altitudes for all intruders
within a specified look-ahead time. In Fig. 9 the heading OmniBands are shown as red, yellow, and
green sectors at the center indicating the ranges of target headings (the “bands”) that would result
in high severity conflicts, low severity conflicts, and no conflicts respectively. A pilot is expected
to use the OmniBands information for choosing a target heading, preferably within one of “green”
sectors. The altitude OmniBands can be used in a similar way (they are presented as the bars of
different colors as seen on the right side of Fig. 9). Note that the appearance of the OmniBands
in the figure is display specific.
Figure 9. A concept of OmniBands tool
Support for OmniBands is more complex than directive guidance since the intruders may or may not
be in a predicted conflict. In this case the evaluate function based on the current ownship’s position
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and intent is irrelevant. The brute-force approach, evaluating threats for all target headings, would
not provide the required realtime performance.
Therefore, a faster algorithm for OmniBands was introduced in JADEM. It relies on the ability
of GRA to quickly find candidate conflict-free resolutions, such as right and left turns for heading
maneuvers, for any intruder representing a potential threat. These conflict-free resolutions define
the bounds of an alerted heading band for this threat.
An intruder represents a potential threat if it can be reached (“intercepted”) from current ownship
state. This can be determined efficiently by chasing an intruder’s predicted CPA without generating
the entire intercepting trajectory.
Therefore, the algorithm for finding heading bands does the following,
1. for each separation standard (each corresponding to a severity level)
(a) determine potential threats by finding the intruders that can be intercepted;
(b) find bands for each of these threats from GRA maneuvers in both directions;
2. assemble the OmniBands for all intruders and severity levels by combining the bands for
individual intruders from previous step.
The algorithm performs linearly with the number of potential threats (intercepted intruders) and
has near-constant performance for all other intruders because the intercept search is very fast.
In principle, a similar approach could be used for altitude bands as well. However, since the
altitude bands had to be defined only at a few discrete altitude levels, a simpler “almost-brute-
force” algorithm provided adequate performance. The algorithm simply calls GCE for each of
discrete altitude levels to determine, which of these levels present high and low severity threats.
In addition to meeting the performance requirements for OmniBands calculations, the use of
GRACE also ensures that all heading and altitude bands are “realistic” as based on ownship
performance parameters for rates of turn, climb, and descent (see Section 4.2.6).
6.4 Well Clear Recovery
OmniBands guidance improved pilot performance in avoiding LoWC and was well received by
the pilots, but it was found to have one major problem. When Loss of Well Clear (LoWC) was
imminent, the OmniBands became “saturated” meaning that they included no “green” intervals
at all. Therefore, the pilots were left without any guidance in situations when they needed it the
most.
To remedy this drawback, the concept of Well Clear Recovery (WCR) was proposed and imple-
mented in JADEM. WCR guidance tells a pilot the safest direction to maneuver to restore Well
Clear.
WCR guidance bases its decisions on the maneuver suggested by GRA in “UseBest” control mode
(see Section 4.2.6) and can be presented as a “wedge” on the pilot’s display. If the best maneuver is
a left or right turn, it is shown as a green sector (Fig. 10). The vertical maneuver can be displayed
as a sliding bar above or below the current ownship altitude in altitude band intervals.
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Figure 10. Well Clear Recovery guidance
The low and high bounds of the wedge are determined from the values of the relevant control
variable (e.g. heading or altitude) selected by GRA with certain corrections as follows:
• the low bound is the lowest value of the control variable needed for a timely recovery from
LoWC, and the high bound is the GRA maneuver limit;
• both bounds are snapped to a specified grid;
• in all cases the difference between high and low bounds cannot be smaller than a configurable
minimal wedge width.
This is very similar to using GRA as directive guidance, except that a pilot can choose any value
within a wedge.
6.5 TCAS Interoperability
It is expected that the UAS flying in Class A and in transitional Class E airspace will be equipped
with TCAS system. Therefore, the DAA system must ensure interoperability with TCAS guid-
ance in encounters with TCAS-equipped intruders. JADEM was extensively used to validate the
proposed DAA MOPS requirements for TCAS interoperability in recent HITL studies and flight
tests.
GRACE flexibility was critical for success of these experiments since it made it easy to disable the
vertical maneuvers on Corrective TCAS RA or to suppress the individual maneuvers that were not
consistent with Preventive TCAS RA (see Section 5.2).
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7 Evaluation of GRACE Performance
This section provides sample results of GRACE performance obtained using two approaches,
1. Parametric: uses 180 encounter geometries to test the performance of the algorithm under
demanding conditions regardless of likelihood of occurrence in real life.
2. NAS-wide: uses projected UAS mission profiles developed under prior work [49] and recorded
VFR traffic data [50] for a more realistic encounter model.
Three different scenario configurations were used in the parametric evaluation, namely,
1. Baseline: uses “perfect” surveillance data without simulated sensor errors and executes
GRACE resolution maneuvers immediately; the mission profile is recaptured at GRACE
recommended times following each maneuver;
2. Noisy Surveillance: similar to the baseline case but uses airborne radar model paired with a
tracker (see section 7.1); this approximates a real-world fully automated concept;
3. Pilot Delay : similar to the baseline case but uses a model of pilot delayed action; this essen-
tially represents a pilot-in-the-loop concept of operation.
In contrast, a single configuration was used for the NAS-wide case with “perfect” surveillance data,
automatic execution of resolution maneuvers, and mission recapture with no delays.
In the remainder of this section the sensor and tracker models used to generate noisy data are briefly
described, followed by a summary of the metrics used in evaluations of GRACE performance.
Results for the parametric evaluation are then presented, followed by results for the NAS-wide
evaluation.
7.1 Sensor and Tracker Models
As mentioned above, sensor and tracker models were used to provide noisy detection of traffic. The
sensor models, developed by Honeywell under contract to NASA, include ADS-B, Mode-S, Mode-C,
and airborne radar sensors.
The ADS-B model is used to detect intruders equipped with ADS-B out. Mode S and Mode C
models detect intruders equipped with Mode S or Mode C transponders. The Radar model is used
to detect intruders not equipped with any transponder.
Roughly speaking, ADS-B provides very accurate horizontal position and altitude, Mode S and
Mode C provide noisy horizontal position but accurate altitude, and radar provides fairly accurate
horizontal position but noisy altitude. Note that, in addition, the radar model detects intruders
probabilistically, meaning that intruders within its nominal field of regard have a finite probability
of not being detected and vice versa. Table 1 summarizes the radar characteristics used in section
7.3.
In addition to the four sensor models, a navigation model is provided, which creates “noisy” ownship
states with position and velocity error.
The tracker used in this study is a proprietary fusion tracker developed by Honeywell [51].
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Table 1. Airborne Radar Parameters
Field of View Position Error Detection
ProbabilityRange Bearing Elevation Range Bearing Elevation
13 nmi 135◦ 20◦ 10 m 0.4◦ 0.4◦ 0.95%
7.2 Performance Metrics
JADEM fast-time simulator calculates a number of metrics that can be used to evaluate system
performance. The metrics most relevant to GRACE are listed below.
Conflicts number of conflicts (encounters)
Resolutions total number of resolutions proposed by GRE
Changes Per
Encounter
number of changes in resolution type, such as a right turn followed
by a left turn or by a vertical maneuver, divided by the number
of encounters (conflicts)
Predicted Violations number of times when GRE predicted a violation (as defined in
4.1.1) for any separation standard within a specified look-ahead
time
Actual Violations number of times when GRE detected a violation; this indicates
that an avoidance maneuver failed to resolve a conflict
Failure Rate a ratio of number of failures to resolve a conflict to number of
detected conflicts in %
Predicted NMAC number of times when GRE predicted a NMAC within a specified
look-ahead time
Actual NMAC number of times when GRE detected an NMAC; this indicates a
failure of DAA system to prevent an imminent NMAC
SNMAC SNMAC = max(RNMACRCPA ,
ZNMAC
ZCPA
) × 100, where S is a simple mea-
sure of severity, R is the range, and Z is the vertical separation.
SNMAC exceeds 100% in case of Actual NMAC and lower val-
ues of SNMAC correspond to larger separations at CPA relative to
NMAC zone
7.3 Parametric Evaluation of GRACE Performance
JADEM provides a way to automatically generate a diverse set of encounter geometries for a
given ownship flight. This capability was used to evaluate performance of GRACE as a guidance
algorithm. JADEM models automatic guidance by immediately executing GRACE recommended
maneuvers. To model pilots in the loop, JADEM introduces configurable delays in evaluation and
execution of GRACE resolutions. In both cases JADEM tries to “recapture” the earliest reachable
waypoint after the end of a GRACE maneuver.
GRACE performance was evaluated for perfect and noisy non-cooperative sensors with 8nmi de-
tection range. A theoretical omnidirectional sensor was used to study the effect of pilot delay on
the performance of GRACE, while onboard radar and tracker models were used to evaluate the
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effect of noise.
All test cases in this sub-section were generated for a 50-minute ownship flight departing from
cartesian coordinates X = Y = 0 and following the multi-turn mission plan shown in Fig. 11. This
mission plan was typically used in HITL simulations based on Oakland Air Route Traffic Control
Center, sector 40/41.
Figure 11. The ownship flight
Intruders cross the ownship’s trajectory at five different points, which may occur before, after,
or within turns. Encounters are created at each of these points for four headings, three ground
speeds, and three vertical speeds (level, climb, descent) for a total of 180 encounters, all of which are
designed to result in NMAC. Each of these encounters was processed separately and independently
from others, and a summary of statistics for all encounters was generated. This is equivalent to
repeating the same ownship flight for 180 different intruders.
GRACE was configured to provide guidance for preventing LoWC with DMOD = HMD = 0.66nmi ,
ZTHR = 450ft , and modTau = 35sec. If LoWC could not be prevented, GRACE works to avoid
NMAC and maximize separation at CPA. In all these tests GRACE is called every second with two
minutes prediction horizon (look-ahead time), which is typical for DAA applications.
Table 2 summarizes the results for three sensor models, namely,
1. Omnidrectional: a theoretical perfect sensor that can detect all intruders within a geometric
cylinder with a range of 8 nmi , a height of ±5000 ft ;
2. Directional Perfect: a tracker and sensor model of airborne radar, configured as defined in
Table 1, but using the truth ownship and intruder states without sensor noise and navigation
errors;
3. Directional Noisy: the same directional tracker and sensor model of airborne radar, which
uses the perturbed ownship and intruder states with added sensor noise and navigation errors
as defined in Table 1.
With unlimited look-ahead time and sensor Field-of-Regard any algorithm can be reasonably ex-
pected to avoid all LoWC events. Table 2 demonstrates that with an 8nmi sensor range and a 2min
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look-ahead time, GRACE was still able to prevent most LoWC events. Moreover, GRACE avoided
NMAC in all cases when LoWC could not be prevented. Note that, in the table, the number of
predicted violations exceeds the number of encounters for two reasons; first, return to mission plan
may generate a secondary conflict, and second, for the directional cases, multiple resolutions may
be commanded for each encounter (this is particularly evident for the noisy case).
Table 2. GRACE performance in simulated encounters using different sensors
Sensor Predicted
Violations
Predicted
NMAC
Changes per
Encounter
Actual
Violations
Failure
Rate (%)
SNMAC (%)
Mean Max
Omnidirectional 209 174 0.056 1 0.6 15 15
Directional perfect 246 149 0.006 9 5.1 34.3 39.5
Directional noisy 380 4 1.11 13 7.3 31.8 46.8
In the case of the omnidirectional sensor only one conflict was not resolved. Analysis of this
conflict showed that it was an artifact of JADEM recapture logic combined with a mismatch in
handling turns. JADEM’s flight simulator always executes turns in flyover mode (i.e. after crossing
a waypoint), whereas GRACE was configured in this study to use flyby mode. This discrepancy
induced a secondary conflict on recapture after the primary conflict was successfully resolved. In
essence, this is a problem that needs to be addressed in JADEM.
The failure rate appears significantly higher in the case of directional perfect and noisy sensors.
Closer examination revealed that all these failures could be attributed to late surveillance detections
with intruders being detected when they were already in LoWC state. Moreover, in all these cases
the detected trajectories were already diverging after they passed CPA, so no maneuvers were
needed to improve the situation. These late detections are an artifact of sensor performance, which
was not a focus of this study. For both perfect and noisy sensors GRACE was able to resolve all
conflicts that were not detected too late. The number of changed resolutions per encounter for
perfect sensors was very low (less than 0.06). For noisy sensors the number of changed resolutions
per encounter increased to 1.1, which is attributed to large vertical errors of non-cooperative radar
sensor.
For concepts that require a pilot to evaluate and execute DAA guidance, a delay is incurred before
the maneuver is finally flown by the UAS control system. DAA algorithms should ensure that
recommended maneuvers remain valid at that time. GRACE allows for delayed response by intro-
ducing a delay parameter (the aforementioned algorithm delay) and computing guidance starting
at a point on ownship’s trajectory corresponding to this delay (keeping the intervening segment
“frozen” as it were; see section 4.2.2).
It should be noted, however, that pilot response delays are not known in advance and vary from
one pilot to another and from one encounter to another. Therefore, it is important to know how
sensitive GRACE performance is to a mismatch between algorithm delay and actual response time.
Table 3 illustrates the effect of algorithm delays when the total pilot response time is 10 seconds.
These delays are chosen based on results of previous HITL studies. For all algorithm delays varying
between 5 and 15 seconds GRACE resolutions avoided all NMACs and prevented almost all LoWC
events.
Table 4 illustrates the effect of pilot response time given a conservative 15-second algorithm delay.
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Table 3. GRACE performance with pilots in the loop for 10-second total response time
Algorithm
Delay
Predicted
Violations
Predicted
NMAC
Changes per
Encounter
Actual
Violations
Failure
Rate (%)
SNMAC (%)
Mean Max
5 seconds 2349 1849 0.73 3 1.7 13.4 13.8
10 seconds 2346 1849 0.64 0 0 – –
15 seconds 2316 1849 0.60 1 0.6 15.6 15.6
For all pilot delays GRACE ensured that all NMACs could be avoided with comfortable safety
margin (SNMAC below 20%). The number of encounters that resulted in LoWC increased with
pilot delays as expected, but remained below 4% of total number of encounters even for total pilot
delay as high as 20 seconds. The number of changed resolutions per encounter was below 1.3 for
all combinations of algorithm and pilot delays.
These results clearly indicate that GRACE remains robust even when pilot delays are large and
differ from delays anticipated by the algorithm.
Table 4. GRACE performance with pilots in the loop for 15-second algorithm delay
Total Pilot
Delay
Predicted
Violations
Predicted
NMAC
Changes per
Encounter
Actual
Violations
Failure
Rate (%)
SNMAC (%)
Mean Max
10 seconds 2316 1849 0.64 1 0.6 15.6 15.6
15 seconds 3419 2636 1.00 6 3.3 8 12.5
20 seconds 4686 3463 1.27 7 3.9 9.9 14.7
7.4 Effectiveness in NAS-wide Mitigated Studies
The effectiveness of GRACE in mitigating collision threats was validated using a 24-hour NAS-wide
fast-time study of simulated UAS traffic and recorded radar Visual Flight Rules (VFR) traffic. In-
strument Flight Rules (IFR) traffic was not included, since separation of IFR traffic will presumably
be maintained by Air Traffic Control. Eighteen UAS mission profiles developed under prior work
were used in this study to simulate a variety of UAS aircraft conducting an assortment of possible
future UAS missions, including: point-to-point transport, regional mapping/monitoring, and pa-
trol [10, 49]. The 24-hour scenario included more than 17,000 UAS flights with about 10,000 total
flight hours, mostly in transitional class E airspace in proximity to VFR traffic [49]. It was assumed
that all unmanned aircraft were equipped with cooperative ADS-B and MODE-C sensors and a
non-cooperative directional sensor with 8-nmi range typical for onboard radars. VFR traffic was
modeled as a mix of flights with and without cooperative sensors. The study leveraged JADEM’s
NAS-wide simulation capability and used a kinematic performance model (MATG) for flying UAS
missions (honoring commanded resolutions) and for evaluating resolution candidates in GRACE.
UAS-to-UAS encounters were not considered in this study, and algorithm performance was evalu-
ated in aggregate over all airspaces. Note that, while the study used perfect surveillance sensors,
the VFR data is itself inherently noisy.
The study compares two simulations: “unmitigated” and “mitigated.” The unmitigated simulation,
for which GRACE resolutions are neither commanded nor executed, represents the baseline scenario
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for UAS without active DAA systems. In contrast, the mitigated simulation commands and executes
GRACE resolutions. Moreover, JADEM’s flight simulator “recaptures” the UAS nominal flight plan
after successful avoidance maneuvers. This recapture can in turn result in secondary conflicts.
This study did not model communication failures, latency, or delayed pilot responses. Work to
include more realistic models of pilot behavior with random delays is currently underway.
Table 5 compares the results of the two simulations and shows that mitigation reduced the number
of predicted violations by a factor of eight and the number of actual violations by a factor of five.
GRACE failed to prevent actual violations for only 2.5% of conflicts with predicted violations.
More importantly, mitigation reduced the number of predicted NMAC events by a factor of 33,
and eliminated all actual NMACs. The frequency of changed resolutions averaged at the level of
0.4 per encounter.
Changes in resolution types and failures to resolve conflicts can both be attributed to late detections,
with intruders first detected when they are too close to ownship. The situation is further compli-
cated by unknown intruder intent, with GRACE having to rely on extrapolated (dead-reckoned)
intruder trajectories.
Table 5. Effect of mitigation on a full-day simulated UAS traffic over the NAS
Simulation Predicted
Violations
Actual
Violations
Predicted
NMAC
Actual
NMAC
SNMAC (%)
Mean Max
Unmitigated 115409 1894 2220 44 29.4 546.3
Mitigated 14394 359 68 0 20.2 92.2
These results clearly show that GRACE, used as an automatic guidance algorithm, could pre-
vent almost all violations of separation, and if this was not possible because of late detection or
unexpected intruder maneuver, GRACE could still avoid the NMAC.
8 Conclusions
Safe integration of UAS into the NAS required development and validation of DAA systems as a
means to comply with the FAA-mandated “see-and-avoid” requirement for human pilots. Despite
the diversity of algorithms that could potentially provide DAA functions, NASA recognized the
need for a fast and flexible “generic” alerting and resolution algorithm that could help reduce
the complexity of DAA system modeling. To fill that need, the Generic Resolution Advisor and
Conflict Evaluator (GRACE) was implemented in NASA’s Java Architecture for DAA Extensibility
and Modeling to provide alerting, directive guidance, trial planning capabilities, OmniBands, and
Well Clear Recovery guidance.
GRACE was designed without any assumptions regarding performance capabilities of aircraft or
its sensor and communication systems. This made it suitable for various applications and DAA
guidance concepts. In particular, GRACE can be used in prototyping various decision support
tools for ground pilots. Furthermore, GRACE makes no assumptions about degree of autonomy.
This allows it to be used in fully autonomous UAS DAA capability, in remotely piloted aircraft,
and potentially even in manned flights.
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The new algorithm was validated and used in a number of Human-in-the-Loop experiments, in
flight tests with live aircraft, in parametric studies with diverse encounter geometries, and in full-
day NAS-wide simulations. All these tests demonstrated the ability of GRACE to reduce the
frequency and severity of Losses of Well Clear and to prevent NMAC in interactions with other
aircraft flying by VFR.
Current and future work includes using GRACE to improve robustness of DAA resolutions, taking
into account uncertainties of intruder positions and intent.
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